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Balkanization of the Local Patent Rules and a Proposal
to Balance Uniformity and Local Experimentation
by Grace Pak*
I. Introduction
Local patent rules are proliferating. As of
April 2011, there are eighteen district courts with local
patent rules.1 The first was the Northern District of
California in 2000, and since then other district courts
have followed suit with accelerating pace. Even courts
without formal local patent rules sometimes apply the
local patent rules of another court upon the litigants’
request or the judge’s own volition.2
Local patent rules regulate many crucial issues
in patent litigation, such as discovery obligations,
claim construction, and time to trial. The local patent
rules are beneficial because they streamline a patent
case and thus help manage the complexity of patent
cases.3 They also provide a standard structure and
promote consistency and certainty in how patent cases
are managed.4 Even further, they alleviate inefficiencies
by addressing issues that tend to recur in most patent
cases.5
The local patent rules vary considerably from
one forum to the next. In fact, the collection of the
local patent rules is myriad and diverse, leading to
disuniformity and balkanization in patent procedure.
The diversity of local patent rules, however, also allows
flexibility to experiment with innovative approaches to
patent procedure.
This article proposes a system for patent
procedure that strikes a balance between uniformity
and experimentation. Under this system, a central
agency coordinates the process of experimentation and
* University of California, Hastings College of the Law, J.D.
2010. Northwestern University, B.S. in Biomedical Engineering,
2005.
1. These courts are N.D. Cal., S.D. Cal., N.D. Ga., D. Idaho,
N.D. Ill., S.D. Ind., D. Mass., D. Minn., E.D. Mo., E.D.N.C.,
W.D.N.C., D.N.J., N.D. Ohio., S.D. Ohio, W.D. Pa., E.D. Tex.,
S.D. Tex, and W.D. Wash.
2. See e.g., Server Tech., Inc. v. Am. Power Conversion Corp.,
No. 3:06-CV-00698-LRH-VPC, 2010 WL 1688721, at *1 (D.
Nev. Apr. 26, 2010); Streck, Inc. v. Research & Diagnostic Sys.,
Inc., 658 F.Supp.2d 988, 993 (D. Neb. 2009); Convolve, Inc. v.
Compaq Computer Corp., No. 00-5141, 2006 WL 2527773, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2006).
3. E.g., D. Minn. LR 2005 Patent Advisory Committee’s
Preface.
4. Id.
5. Id.
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ensures a uniform, national perspective.
This article is comprised of five parts. Part II
examines the history of the Civil Justice Reform Act
of 1990 (“CJRA”), which created a vast collection of
local rules in civil procedure. Parts II.A-B examine
the primary rationale supporting local rulemaking,
namely experimentation, as well as the criticisms
attacking local rulemaking, namely balkanization and
disuniformity. Part II.C discusses the disappointing
results of the CJRA, and investigates the reasons for
those shortcomings. Parts III-IV discuss the extent
of the variability between the local patent rules and
the impact it has on the national patent system. Part
V finishes with a proposal, based on lessons from the
CJRA, to create a central agency for patent procedure.
II. A History Lesson from the Civil Justice
Reform Act of 1990
Balkanization of local rules is not a new
phenomenon; it was also present during the aegis of
the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 (“CJRA”).6 The
overarching goal of the CJRA was reform of civil
litigation, and its proponents believed that “reform
must come from ‘the bottom up’ – that is, from
those who must live with the civil justice system on a
regular basis.”7 Thus, the CJRA required each of the
ninety-four district courts to experiment with different
solutions to combat cost and delay in civil litigation.8
During this period, local rulemaking was in overdrive.
A. The Rationale Behind the CJRA: Local
Experimentation and Innovation
Supporters of the CJRA urged that local
experimentation would lead to innovative solutions.9
The CJRA envisioned that each of the ninety-four
district courts would be a laboratory, in much the
6. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee’s note on 2000
amendments.
7. S. Rep. No. 101-416, at 14 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6802, 6817.
8. 28 U.S.C.A. § 471 (2010) (no longer in force).
9. Edward D. Cavanagh, The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990
and the 1993 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:
Can Systemic Ills Afflicting The Federal Courts be Remedied by Local
Rules?, 67 St. John’s Rev. 721, 728 (1993).
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same way that states are seen as laboratories.10 Justice
Brandeis famously remarked that “[i]t is one of the
happy incidents of the federal system that a single
courageous State may . . . try novel social and economic
experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”11
Similarly, under the local experimentation system
of the CJRA, a single district court could try novel
experiments without risk to the entire court system.
In this vein, local district courts have been favorably
characterized as “useful testing grounds.”12
B. Criticisms Attacking the CJRA
Unfortunately, the benefits of experimentation
come at the price of disuniformity, which brings with it
a host of problems.
1. Legal Clutter: Complexity, Confusion,
and Inefficiency
The proliferation of local differences creates
what Professor Paul Carrington calls “legal clutter.”13
Legal clutter creates complexity, confusion, less
understanding of the local rules, and more billable
hours.14 Lawyers find it inordinately difficult
to practice in more than one jurisdiction, even
though the federal court system is supposed to be
national.15 Navigating through this “minefield,” as one
commentator describes it, inevitably leads to missteps
and errors.16 As errors are made, litigants are harmed,
and court time and billable hours are spent fixing the
errors.17 All this increases expenses, enhances delays,
creates inefficiencies, and hinders the vindication of
substantive rights.18
2. Unfairness, Unpredictability, and Forum
Shopping
Additionally, the variation of local rules
undermines some of the core foundational principles
of our legal system. A common underpinning of
10. A. Leo Levin, Local Rules as Experiments: A Study in the
Division of Power, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1567, 1581 (1991).
11. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311
(1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
12. Cavanagh, supra note 9, at 733.
13. Paul D. Carrington, A New Confederacy? Disunionism in
the Federal Courts, 45 Duke L.J. 929, 947-48 (1996).
14. Id.
15. Id. at 948.
16. See Gregory C. Sisk, The Balkanization of Appellate Justice:
The Proliferation of Local Rules in the Federal Circuits, 68 U. Colo.
L. Rev. 1, 27 (1997) (discussing the variation of local rules in the
context of appellate courts).
17. Id. at 31.
18. Id. at 27.

procedural justice is that like cases should be treated
alike.19 But because of the variation in local rules,
equally meritorious cases are treated unfairly through
the application of different local rules. When the
outcome of a case is susceptible to variations in the
local rules, the unpredictability that ensues threatens
the legal system as well. Citizens begin to lose faith
in the court system if the results seem random.20 The
diverse collection of local rules further stimulates forum
shopping, which exacerbates the problems of unfairness
and unpredictability.21
C. Reasons Why Experimentation Under the
CJRA Was Not Successful
In 1997, the CJRA sunsetted.22 In its
concluding observations, the Judicial Conference
reported that “the process of experimentation and
innovation under the CJRA raises serious questions
about the relative balance between national uniformity
and local option.”23 Multiple commentators noted
that the local experiments were futile and that the
level of disuniformity caused too many problems. The
same could be said of the local variations in patent
procedure. After all, the arguments supporting and
attacking the proliferation of local rulemaking are no
different in the context of local patent rules than in
the context of the CJRA. But first, it would be wise to
diagnose the problems with the CJRA.
A critical flaw of local experimentation under
the CJRA was its “bottom up” approach, under which
each district court adopted its own experimental local
rules.24 To demonstrate why this is problematic,
Professors Rubin and Feeley make an analogy to
medical research.25 In medical research, the researcher
does not ask her subjects to evaluate their own
medical conditions and then follow whatever course of
treatment they desire.26 Yet this was essentially what
the CJRA was asking the district courts to do. In the
medical research example, the subjects are not experts
19. William B. Rubenstein, The Concept of Equality in Civil
Procedure, 23 Cardozo L. Rev. 1865, 1893 (2002).
20. Id.
21. Erwin Chemerinsky & Barry Friedman, The
Fragmentation of Federal Rules, 46 Mercer L. Rev. 757, 777-78
(1995).
22. Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, §
103(b)(2), 104 Stat. 5089, 5096.
23. Judicial Conference, The Civil Justice Reform Act
of 1990 Final Report 45 (1997).
24. Chemerinsky & Friedman, supra note 21, at 789, 791.
25. Edward L. Rubin & Malcom Feeley, Federalism: Some
Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. Rev. 903, 926 (1994).
26. Id.
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in medicine, they are not given any guidance from the
medical researcher, and the medical researcher imposes
no control over the experiment.
The flaws in the local rulemaking system under
the CJRA are analogous. Only experts in social science
and empirical research were capable of performing the
complex directives of the CJRA: identify the principal
causes of cost and delay in civil litigation, identify
trends in case filings and demands on the court’s
resources, and examine the extent to which costs and
delays could be reduced.27 The advisory groups to
whom these tasks were assigned were composed of
“attorneys and other . . . representative[s] of major
categories of litigants.”28 They may very well have
been accomplished people, but when it came to social
science expertise, empirical research, and rulemaking,
they have been described as “lay” and “amateur.”29
Furthermore, the CJRA did not equip the advisory
groups with any evaluative criteria, guidelines, or
techniques for performing the tasks the CJRA assigned.
30
The advisory groups were left in a “methodological
lurch.”31
It is therefore no surprise that the district
courts used different methods, baselines, and
assumptions in executing the mandates of the
CJRA.32 There were no control groups and no one
was controlling the grander experimentation scheme.33
As a result, the “data” generated by these experiments
could not be used as a basis for construing meaningful
conclusions.34 In the meanwhile, unnecessary
balkanization emerged.
The critical missing element to the success
of local experimentation was an overseeing central
agency.35 A central agency was needed to design and
control experiments with expertise and analyze data in
a scientific manner.36
The local patent rules are on track to repeat
the fate of the CJRA. If the local patent rules are
allowed to perpetuate from the “bottom-up,” the price
27. See Linda S. Mullenix, The Counter-Reformation in
Procedural Justice, 77 Minn. L. Rev. 375, 405 (1992); 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 472(c) (1990) (no longer in force).
28. 28 U.S.C.A. § 478(a)-(b) (1990) (no longer in force).
29. Mullenix, supra note 27, at 405.
30. See Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101650, 104 Stat. 5089; Mullenix, supra note 27, at 402.
31. Mullenix, supra note 27, at 404.
32. Id. at 403.
33. Chemerinsky & Friedman, supra note 21, at 790-91.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
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will be unnecessary disuniformity and balkanization.
Additionally, the local rule experiments will not reach
their full potential to produce innovations in patent
procedure.
III. Balkanization of the Local Patent Rules
Part III illustrates the extent of balkanization
of the local patent rules by surveying the local patent
rules of eighteen district courts, with a specific focus
on contention and document production rules, which
regulate discovery.
A. Background About Contentions and
Document Production Rules
Contentions and document production rules
require the parties to disclose early in the litigation
the specifics about their infringement theories. For
example, the patent-holder must disclose which patent
claims it is asserting against which products of the
infringer,37 and the accused-infringer must disclose its
theories of invalidity.38
The impetus for contentions and document
production rules was the “shifting sands” problem.39
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure’s simplified
notice pleading system, parties often recited only the
bare bones of their allegations against each other.40
This left each party unsure about the opposing party’s
theories.41 As a result, the initial theories that each
party offered were hedged and susceptible to change.42
Parties would, for example, assert different patent
claims or different pieces of prior art.43 The true issues
in dispute were not ascertained until the late stages of
discovery. 44 Contentions and document production
rules alleviate these problems by requiring the parties
to promptly disclose the bases for their underlying
claims.45 Thereby, local patent rules crystallize theories
early in the case.46
37. E.g., N.D. Cal. Patent L.R. 3-1.
38. Id. at 3-3.
39. Peter S. Mennell et al., Patent Case Management
Judicial Guide 1-1, 2-9 (Federal Judicial Center) (2009) (citing
LG Elecs., Inc. v. Q-Lity Computer, Inc., 211 F.R.D. 360, 367
(N.D. Cal. 2002)).
40. Id. at 2-8. But see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937,
1940 (2009) (raising the pleading standard under Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(a)(2) to one of “facial plausibility”).
41. Mennell, supra note 39, at 2-8 – 2-9.
42. Id. at 2-9.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. See, e.g., N.D. Cal. Patent L.R. 3-1 – 3-4
46. Atmel Corp. v. Info. Storage Devices, Inc., No. C 951987, 1998 WL 775115, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 5 1998).
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B. Balkanization of Contentions and Document
Production Rules
All the forums require Infringement
Contentions and Invalidity Contentions, but the
information that must be disclosed in these contentions
varies dramatically. To demonstrate the degree of
variation between these rules, the rules of all eighteen
district courts with local patent rules are surveyed: 47 (1)
Northern District of California, (2) Southern District
of California, (3) Northern District of Georgia, (4)
District of Idaho, (5) Northern District of Illinois,
(6) Southern District of Indiana, (7) District of
Massachusetts, (8) District of Minnesota, (9), Eastern
District of Missouri, (10) District of New Jersey, (11)
Eastern District of North Carolina, (12), Western
District of North Carolina, (13) Northern District of
Ohio, (14), Southern District of Ohio, (15) Western
District of Pennsylvania, (16) Eastern District of Texas,
(17) Southern District of Texas, and (18) Western
District of Washington.

9. priority dates to which each claim is
entitled
10. identification of the patent-holder’s
own products/methods that practice the
claimed invention if the patent-holder
wishes to rely on those products/methods
for any purpose
The table that follows highlights the divergence
between the infringement contention rules in different
forums:

1. Infringement Contentions
Each district court requires the patent-holder
to disclose some combination of the categories of
information listed below.
1. each claim that the patent-holder is
asserting against the accused-infringer
2. for each claim, the applicable subsection of
35 U.S.C. § 271
3. a specific identification of each product/
method of the accused-infringer that the
patent-holder alleges is infringing
4. a claim chart that maps the limitations of
the asserted claims to the limitations of the
accused product/method
5. if there are means-plus-function
limitations in the asserted claims,
identification of the structure in the
accused product/method that performs the
claimed function
6. whether the patent-holder is asserting
literal infringement or infringement
under the doctrine of equivalents for each
asserted claim limitation
7. details on allegations of indirect
infringement
8. bases for allegations of willful infringement
47. Much of this information was collected with the help of
Travis M. Jensen, Patent Local Rules--A Summary and Comparison,
997 PLI/Pat 959, 981 (2010).
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484950515253545556575859606162636465

48. S.D. Cal. Patent L.R. 3.1.
49. S.D. Ind. Case Management Plan for Patent Cases Phase I, III.C.
50. E.D.N.C. Civ. R. 303.1.
51. W.D. Pa. LPR 3.1.
52. E.D. Tex. P. R. 3-1.
53. S.D. Tex. P. R. 3-1.
54. N.D. Cal. Patent L.R. 3-1.
55. D. Idaho Loc. Patent R. 3.1.
56. N.D. Ill. LPR 2.2.
57. D.N.J. L. Pat. R. 3.1.
58. D. Mass. LR 16.6 App. (A)(1).
59. D. Minn. LR 16.2 Form 4 (f )(1).
60. N.D. Ga. Patent L.R. 4.1.
61. N.D. Ohio L.P.R. 3.1.
62. W.D. Wash. Local Patent Rules 120.
63. W.D.N.C. P.R. 3.1.
64. E.D. Mo. Local Patent R. 3-1.
65. S.D. Ohio. Pat.L.R. 103.2.
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2. Invalidity Contentions
The substance of the accused-infringer’s
Invalidity Contentions similarly varies across the
forums. Depending on the forum, the accusedinfringer must disclose some combination of the
following categories of information in its Invalidity
Contentions:
1. identification of prior art of which the accusedinfringer is currently aware
2. whether each item of prior art anticipates each
asserted claim or renders it obvious
3. an explanation of why the prior art renders a
claim obvious
a. Some local rules provide a general
requirement that the accused-infringer
explain its obviousness contentions.
b. Other local rules spell out what
information the accused-infringer
must include in its obviousness
contentions. Specifically, these local
rules may require an identification
of the combinations of prior art that
render a claim obvious and/or the
motivation to combine those pieces of
prior art.
4. a claim chart that maps the limitations of the
asserted claims to the limitations of the prior
art
5. if there are means-plus-function limitations
in the asserted claims, the chart must identify
the structure in the prior art that performs the
claimed function
6. Other grounds of invalidity
a. Some sets of local rules provide a
general requirement that the accusedinfringer must disclose grounds of
invalidity.
b. Other sets of local rules spell out the
grounds of invalidity for which the
accused-infringer must disclose details.
The grounds of invalidity specified by
these local rules include non-statutory
subject matter, indefiniteness, lack
of enablement, lack of written
description, and violations of best
mode.
The table below charts the differences between the
invalidity contention rules in each forum:
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666768697071727374757677787980818283

66. N.D. Ill. LPR 2.3(b).
67. S.D. Ind. Case Management Plan for Patent Cases Phase I III.D.
68. W.D. Pa. LPR 3.3.
69. E.D. Tex. P. R. 3-3.
70. S.D. Ohio. Pat.L.R. 103.4.
71. N.D. Cal. Patent L.R. 3-3.
72. D. Idaho Loc. Patent R. 3.3.
73. D.N.J. L. Pat. R. 3.3.
74. S.D. Cal. Patent L.R. 3.3.
75. E.D. Mo. Local Patent R. 3-4.
76. N.D. Ga. Patent L.R. 4.3.
77. D. Mass. LR 16.6 App. (A)(2).
78. D. Minn. LR 16.2 Form 4 (g)(1).
79. E.D.N.C. Local Civil Rule 303.3.
80. N.D. Ohio L.P.R. 3.5(a)-(d).
81. S.D. Tex. P. R. 3-3.
82. W.D. Wash. Local Patent Rules 121.
83. W.D.N.C. P.R. 3.3.
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C. The Federal Circuit’s General Non-Interference
Policy
The survey of the local patent rules on
contentions and document productions reveals a
staggering array of differences. One possible way
to hone the collection of local rules is through the
authority of the Federal Circuit, which has the power
to adjudge local patent rules invalid, as well as the
authority to review a district court’s interpretation and
application of local rules.84 However, given the Federal
Circuit’s acclaim of local patent rules, it is unlikely that
the Federal Circuit would adjudge any of the current
local patent rules invalid.85 Moreover, the Federal
Circuit has expressed a preference not to step in and
overrule the district courts on matters of interpreting
and applying local patent rules.86
Without any central authority regulating the
local patent rules, the disuniformity of the local patent
rules will likely become more severe as more courts
adopt local patent rules.
IV. The Benefits and Harms Flowing from
Variations Between the Local Patent Rules
The vast and diversified collection of local
patent rules has disrupted uniformity, but it has also
led to innovations through experimentation. Parts IV.
A-G. provide specific examples.
A. Benefits Flowing from Variations Between the
Local Patent Rules
1. The Creation of the Local Patent Rules
The patent community widely regards the
local patent rules in themselves as positive. They
help manage the complexity of patent cases, provide
some degree of predictability, and create efficiencies
by regulating the same issues that tend to recur.87 The
Federal Circuit has also applauded the local patent rules
for crystallizing theories early in the case.88
84. O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Monolithic Power Sys., 467 F.3d
1355, 1365-67 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
85. See id. at 1365-66 (explaining that the local patent rules
“seek to balance the right to develop new information in discovery
with the need for certainty as to the legal theories”).
86. Genentech v. Amgen, 289 F.3d 761, 774 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
See also Sandisk Corp. v. Memorex Prods., Inc., 415 F.3d 1278,
1292 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (explaining that the Federal Circuit gives
“broad deference” to the trial court’s application of local patent
rules); Safeclick, LLC v. Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n, 208 Fed. Appx. 829,
834 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (holding that the standard of review over a
district court’s application of local patent rules is “very deferential”).
87. See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
88. O2 Micro, 467 F.3d at 1365-66 n.12 (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted).

The local patent rules exist in large part
because local experimentation made them possible.
The first court to adopt local patent rules was the
Northern District of California in 2001.89 For three
years it was the only court with local patent rules,90
presumably because the idea of a specialized set of local
rules for patent law was novel and untested. After
numerous patent cases were litigated on the N.D.
Cal.’s “testing ground,” it can be assumed that the
local patent rules reaped enough apparent benefit to
influence multiple other courts into adopting their own
local patent rules.91 In drafting each successive set of
local patent rules, the courts seemed to observe and
learn from each other’s experiences and contribute their
own variations to their local patent rules.92 Therefore,
the local patent rules today appear to be a product of
localized “trial-runs” and a build-up of experiences.
2. Innovative Approaches to Claim
Construction Briefing
Local experimentation also makes possible
innovations in specific procedural issues. The Northern
District of Illinois’s procedures for claim construction
briefing are one such example. The Northern District
of Illinois is the only court that requires the accusedinfringer to open claim construction briefing.93 In all
the other district courts, the patent-holder files the first
claim construction brief.94 When the patent-holder
files the first brief, it often argues for “plain meaning”
constructions.95 Then, the accused-infringer offers
its constructions in its response brief.96 Only in its
reply and closing brief does the patent-holder finally
offer detailed constructions.97 This method left the

89. N.D. Cal. Patent L.R. 1-3 (2000).
90. The first court to adopt local patent rules after the N.D.
Cal. was the N.D. Ga. in 2004. See N.D. Ga. LPR 1.3 (explaining
that the effective date of the local patent rules is July 15, 2004).
91. James Ware & Brian Davy, The History, Content,
Application and Influence of the Northern District of California’s Local
Rules, 25 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech. L.J. 965, 100708 (2009).
92. E.g., D. Minn. LR 2005 Patent Advisory Committee’s
Preface; D.N.J. L. Pat. R. Report of the Local Rules Committee;
Judge Matthew F. Kennelly & Edward D. Manzo, Northern District
of Illinois Adopts Local Patent Rules, 9 J. Marshall Rev. Intell.
Prop. L. 202, 204-05 (2009).
93. N.D. Ill. LPR 4.2.
94. E.g., N.D. Cal. 4-5.
95. R. David Donoghue, New Northern District of Illinois
Local Patent Rules Will Drive Cases to Chicago, 3 Bloomberg Law
Reports (2009).
96. Id.
97. Id.
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accused-infringer without a chance to reply.98 The
Northern District of Illinois hoped that its method,
which requires the accused-infringer to open claim
construction briefing, would lead to a more focused
debate.99
B. Harms Flowing From Variations Between the
Local Patent Rules
1. Legal Clutter: Complexity, Confusion,
and Inefficiency
While small variations between the different
sets of local rules represent innovations, they are
also the source of legal clutter. Keeping up with the
minutia of all the different sets of local patent rules
can become inordinately complex, confusing, and
inefficient.100 And it is important to know the local
patent rules in detail, because non-compliance can
leave a case in ruins. For example, in Genentech v.
Amgen, the patent-holder was precluded from asserting
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents because
it failed to assert the doctrine of equivalents in its claim
charts as required by the local rules.101
It is understandable that a litigant can become
confused about whether it is required to disclose
a certain theory in its contentions. For example,
different forums take different approaches to the issue
of disclosing a “best mode” theory of invalidity.102
The different approaches can be grouped into three
categories:
1) Best mode is specifically identified and must be
disclosed103
2) “[A]ny grounds of invalidity based on any
applicable provision under 35 U.S.C. § 112”
must be disclosed, but best mode is not
specifically identified104
3) “[A]ny grounds of invalidity based on
indefiniteness under 35 U.S.C. § 112(2) or
enablement or written description under 35
U.S.C. § 112(1)” must be disclosed, but best
98. Id.
99. N.D. Ill. LPR 4.2. Comment.
100. See discussion supra Part. II.B.1.
101. Genentech v. Amgen, 289 F.3d 761, 773-74 (Fed. Cir.
2002); See also I-Flow Corp., v. Apex Med. Tech., No. 07-1200,
2008 WL 2899822, at *4 (S.D. Cal. July 25, 2008) (finding that
the accused-infringers waived their argument that certain claim
terms should be construed as means-plus-function elements because
they did not disclose this theory in their invalidity contentions).
102. See discussion supra Part III.A.4.
103. E.g., S.D. Cal. Patent L.R. 3.3(e).
104. E.g., N.D. Ga. Patent L.R. 4.3(a)(4) (emphasis added).
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mode is not specifically identified105
The Northern District of California’s local
patent rules fall into the third category.106 In fact, for
some time, there was confusion over whether those
rules required disclosure of “best mode.”107 In Fresenius
Med. Care Holdings, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., the
patent-holder moved to strike the accused-infringer’s
“best mode” argument because it failed to disclose “best
mode” in its invalidity contentions.108 The patentholder argued that disclosure of “best mode” was
required in invalidity contentions.109 The court held
that technically, the Northern District of California’s
local patent rules do not require disclosure of a “best
mode” theory.110
The confusion over “best mode”—whether
it must be disclosed in invalidity contentions—
represents just one example of the problems caused by
disuniformity and balkanization.
2. Unfairness, Unpredictability, and
Forum Shopping
Unfairness is another problem created by
disuniformity and balkanization of the local patent
rules. To illustrate this point, best mode is again a
useful example. In Fresenius Med. Care Holdings,
the court explained the rationale for not requiring the
accused-infringer to disclose a “best mode” theory in
its invalidity contentions: “The rationale for this is
clear; an accused infringer typically does not have the
evidence necessary to establish its best mode defense
until much later in the discovery process.”111 What is
not so clear, however, is why other forums’ invalidity
contention rules nevertheless require the accusedinfringer to disclose a best mode defense. Accusedinfringers as a group are comparably situated with
regard to their ability to gather evidence to establish a
best mode defense—irrespective of the forum in which
their case is heard. Thus, it is unfair that some accusedinfringers are held to stricter requirements for arguing a
best mode defense, merely because they are in a forum
with a different set of local patent rules.
105. E.g., N.D. Cal. Patent L.R. 3-3(d) (emphasis added).
106. Id.
107. See Ware & Davy, supra note 86, at 991 (noting
ambiguity in N.D. Cal. Patent L.R. 3-3(d) regarding disclosure of
best mode).
108. Fresenius Med. Care Holdings, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc.,
No.03-1431, 2006 WL 1329997 at *5 (N.D. Cal. May 15, 2006).
109. Id.
110. Id. at *6.
111. Id. at *5.
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The different sets of local patent rules have
even more widespread implications on substantive
justice. As the Federal Circuit acknowledged, “issues
concerning the validity and interpretation of such local
[patent] rules are ‘intimately involved in the substance
of enforcement of the patent right.’”112 Commentators
agree that differences in local patent rules can be
outcome determinative.113
Given the import that local patent rules have
on a patent case, it is no surprise that local patent rules
are a key factor in the game of forum shopping.114
Commentators opine that patent-holders’ favoritism of
the Eastern District of Texas, for instance, is due partly
to its local patent rules,115 which have been described
as “shift[ing] the balance toward the plaintiff”116 and as
“stack[ing] the deck against the defendant.”117
The disuniformity of the local patent
rules further leads to problems of unpredictability.
Unpredictability is acutely harmful in patent law
because patent law’s primary objective is to motivate
future behavior.118 If patent rights are uncertain,
some competitors will attribute patent-holders with
an unduly large “zone of no competition.”119 Then,
if competitors choose to compete with the patented
product, they will do so in a less than optimal fashion,
depriving the public of cheaper and higher-quality
goods that competition engenders.120 In other cases,
competitors will attribute an unduly small “zone of
no competition” to patent-holders, and therefore they
will infringe patents more frequently.121 This decreases
the value of the patent to the patent-holder and the
incentive to innovate.122
3. Undermining the Uniformity of
Substantive Patent Law
112. O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Monolithic Power Sys., 467 F.3d
1355, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (emphasis added).
113. Jensen, supra note 49, at 967. See also Yan Leychkis, Of
Fire Ants and Claim Construction: An Empirical Study of the Meteoric
Rise of the Eastern District of Texas as a Preeminent Forum for Patent
Litigation, 9 Yale J.L. & Tech. 193, 224 (2007) (opining that that
the odds of winning a case are impacted by the local patent rules).
114. Leychkis, supra note 113, at 224.
115. E.g. id. at 209.
116. Id. at 222.
117. Id. at 219.
118. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case
Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 67 (1989).
119. Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases:
Does Geographic Choice Affect Innovation?, 83 J. Pat. & Trademark
Off. Soc’y 558, 593-94 (2001).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 593.
122. Id.

Of all the harms that attend the disuniformity
of local patent rules, perhaps the most important is
the undercutting of a uniform body of substantive
patent law. Within the body of substantive patent
law that is supposed to be uniform, the law on
obviousness is one area of concern. In particular, the
Supreme Court’s decision in KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex,
Inc.123 is not embodied uniformly and consistently in
the local patent rules. The Supreme Court in KSR
deemphasized the “teaching, suggestion, or motivation”
test for finding obviousness.124 In other words, to
prove that a patent claim is obvious, it is not always
necessary to point to a motivation to combine prior
art references, because obviousness can be proven in
other ways.125 In recognition of KSR, the Northern
District of California amended its 2000 version of
the local patent rules in 2008 by eliminating the
requirement to identify a motivation to combine in
an accused-infringer’s invalidity contentions.126 In
contrast, a significant number of other local patent
rule jurisdictions retain the requirement to identify a
motivation to combine.127
V. A Proposal Based on Lessons from the
CJRA: Create a Central Agency for Patent
Procedure
The problems inherent in the disuniformity
of patent procedure have caught the attention of
the patent bar, and many patent attorneys have
endorsed national uniformity of local patent rules.128
Consummate unification of the local patent rules,
however, would mean the end of local experimentation.
On the other hand, maintaining the status quo
incubates disuniformity and balkanization.
Fortunately, past experience with the CJRA
informs a solution to this dilemma. Specifically, the
creation of a central agency should minimize the
harms caused by disuniformity and maximize the
benefits of local experimentation.129 Therefore, this
123. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
124. Id. at 419.
125. Id. at 419-421.
126. Ware & Davy, supra note 86, at 1004.
127. E.g., N.D. Ill. LPR 2.3(b); W.D. Pa. LPR 3.3.; E.D. Tex.
P. R. 3-3.; N.D. Ga. Patent L.R. 4.3.
128. E.g., Ware & Davy, supra note 91, at 1014; Leychkis,
supra note 113, at 225; Alisha Kay Taylor, What Does Forum
Shopping in the Eastern District of Texas Mean for Patent Reform?, 6 J.
Marshall Rev. Intell. Prop. L. 570, 583 (2007); Jeff Becker, On
Creating Specialized Patent District Courts: Why H.R. 34 Does Not Go
Far Enough to Address Reversal Rates in District Courts, 61 SMU L.
Rev. 1607, 1632 (2008).
129. See discussion supra Part II.C.
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article proposes that a central agency specializing in
patent procedure should be created to coordinate local
experimentation and ensure uniformity.
One of the primary objectives of the central
agency should be regulating localized experiments. To
ensure the success of these experiments, the central
agency should be staffed by experts in social science,
empirical research, statistics, and rulemaking.
As a first step to managing local experiments,
the central agency should plan and design the
experiments. It should encourage input from the
patent community across the nation, conduct research,
engage in dialogue and debate with members of the
staff and other professionals, and collect hard data
representing the performance of the procedural patent
rules currently in place. Based on this research, the
central agency should formulate a hypothesis and
design a scientifically valid experiment that tests this
hypothesis. The central agency should lay out the
steps of the experiment clearly, prescribe definitive
guidelines, and provide procedures for gathering and
reporting hard data.
Once the central agency finishes designing
an experiment, it should conduct a “trial-run” in
a limited number of district courts. By limiting
the number of district courts, the central agency
minimizes balkanization, minimizes problems inherent
in disuniformity, and establishes control groups. In
addition, it becomes more feasible to test high-risk but
high-gain innovative procedures that ordinarily would
not have been tested on the entire nation. During
the course of the experiment, the central agency
should oversee the district court to make sure that the
experiment runs according to its design.
The expertly designed experiments will yield
valid data, which in turn, serves as a proper basis for
formulating meaningful conclusions. The professional
staff in the central agency will be well-versed in
analyzing the data accurately, applying stringent
methodological analysis, performing sophisticated
statistical analyses, drawing sound inferences, and
developing effectual reforms for patent procedure. As
patent law and patent procedure progressively evolves,
the central agency should utilize this methodology
to continually develop new procedures and improve
existing ones.
Another key objective of the central agency
should be ensuring national uniformity in patent
procedure. When managing the local experiments,
the central agency should do so with a national
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perspective—not only by minimizing balkanization,
but also by taking into consideration how the smallscale experiments will inform national reform in patent
procedure. In addition, when the law changes through
a decision from the Federal Circuit or the Supreme
Court, the central agency should make sure those
changes are properly and consistently integrated into
the procedural rules in all the district courts.
Experimentation according to this proposal
should bear fruit for patent procedure because the
central agency and its expertise make possible welldesigned experiments, which lead to the development
of successful reforms. At the same time, uniformity
is not unduly sacrificed because the central agency
oversees patent procedures in the district courts with an
eye toward national uniformity.
IV. Conclusion
The local patent rules have brought many
benefits to the patent system. Within a particular
forum, the local patent rules permit litigants and the
courts to predict the procedural progression of a case
with some certainty. The local patent rules also reduce
inefficiencies within one forum because they eliminate
the need to readdress procedural issues that frequently
recur in each case. From a policy standpoint, the
local patent rules are beneficial because they minimize
gamesmanship in patent litigation and crystallize the
parties’ theories early in the case.
Under the current structure of local patent
rulemaking, each district court proceeds autonomously.
An advantage of this structure is local experimentation.
Indeed, local experimentation played a large role
in the creation of the local patent rules themselves.
Additionally, specific procedural issues in patent
litigation, such as Markman briefing, are showing
promising signs of innovation as a result of local
experimentation.
Unfortunately, without any control over
the district courts’ local rulemaking, unnecessary
balkanization and disuniformity has emerged.
The consequences are legal clutter, unfairness,
unpredictability, and forum-shopping.
Even though uniformity and local
experimentation are in tension with each other,
a favorable balance can be achieved. The CJRA
is informative in this respect because local rules
burgeoned during the CJRA era, similar to the
development of local patent rules. Specifically,
experiences from the CJRA teach that the creation
of a central agency for patent procedure would be
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salutary for patent law. An expertly staffed central
agency can maximize the value of local experimentation
and minimize the harms of disuniformity. In this
manner, patent procedure can reap the benefits of both
uniformity and experimentation without sacrificing
either.
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